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TIME BANDITS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT GETS IT WRONG BY 
ALLOWING DEBT PURCHASERS TO ESCAPE FDCPA LIABILITY FOR FILING
TIME-BARRED PROOFS OF CLAIM IN CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCIES
JEFFREY MICHALIK*
“You see, to be quite frank, Kevin, the fabric of the universe is far from 
perfect.  It was a bit of botched job, you see.  We only had seven days to 
make it.  And that’s where this comes in.  This is the only map of all the 
holes.  Well, why repair them?  Why not use them to get stinking rich?”1
INTRODUCTION
Professional debt purchasers in the United States have developed a 
scheme to profit from unenforceable debt by abusing predictable break-
downs in the chapter 13 bankruptcy process.  A debt purchaser can buy 
debt in bulk and at a sizeable discount when the state statute of limitations 
on the debt has run.  Although the debt is legally unenforceable against the 
debtor,2 debt purchasers flood bankruptcy courts with proofs of claim for 
those debts.3 The debt is unquestionably time-barred and, if anyone in the 
bankruptcy case objects, the claims are immediately disallowed and the 
debt discharged.4 However, if the claim goes unnoticed and no one objects 
to it, the debt purchaser is paid out through the debtor’s bankruptcy plan.  
These claims for stale debt impair a debtor’s repayment capacity and divert 
funds that could have otherwise gone to creditors with legitimate, enforce-
? J.D., May 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. The author would 
like to thank Professor Adrian Walters for introducing him to this topic and for guiding him through the 
complicated world of chapter 13 bankruptcy law. The author would also like to thank Paul Michalik, 
Sanford Greenberg, and Michelle England for teaching him everything he knows about writing.
1. TIME BANDITS (HandMade Films 1981) [https://perma.cc/Q3M7-47WP].
2. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING 
INDUSTRY (2013), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7FZ-
WDG9].
3. David Light & Richard D.R. Hoffman, 11th Circuit Seeks to Stop Flood of Bogus Bankruptcy 
Claims, THOMAS REUTERS: LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (July 31, 2014), 
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/top-legal-news/11th-circuit-seeks-stop-flood-bogus-
bankruptcy-claims [https://perma.cc/4YGT-VCQT].
4. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2016).
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able claims.  The scheme’s chances of success improve when the debt pur-
chaser floods the courts with these claims: the more claims for debtors, 
attorneys, trustees, and courts to process means more claims for time-
barred debt can slip through the cracks.  And business is booming.5
To protect debtors from abusive collection practices, Congress passed 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in 1977.6 Under this strict 
liability statute, a debtor can bring a cause of action against a debt collector 
who makes “any false, deceptive, or misleading” attempt to collect a debt.7
Whether the debt purchasers’ scheme described above violates the FDCPA 
has created a circuit split.8 In the most recent circuit decision on the issue, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Owens v. LVNV Fund-
ing, LLC that the FDCPA did not prohibit debt purchasers from filing 
proofs of claim for time-barred debts.9 Debt purchasers can therefore con-
tinue to exploit predictable failures of the Bankruptcy Code’s protections to 
collect on otherwise unenforceable debt without fear of FDCPA liability.
Part I of this Note describes the relevant processes and law related to 
chapter 13 bankruptcies, the industry of debt purchasing, and the FDCPA.  
Part II discusses the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Owens in light of that 
legal framework.  Finally, Part III considers not only the text of the statutes 
but also the greater policy implications and argues that Owens was wrongly 
decided because filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt should violate 
the FDCPA.
I. BANKRUPTCY AND DEBT PURCHASING
Perhaps one of the most important functions of the Bankruptcy Code 
is the implementation of the automatic stay.  The stay “is one of the funda-
mental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. . . . It stops all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”10 After a 
debtor initially files for bankruptcy, a stay goes into effect and prohibits 
creditors from going after property of the debtor or the estate without the 
5. See discussion infra Section I.B.
6. Lauren Goldberg, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection After FDCPA,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 718 (2006).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) (2015).
8. Compare Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 2016), with Crawford 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
9. See 832 F.3d at 737.
10. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97; S. 
REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840. 
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bankruptcy court’s permission.11 To seek repayment through the bankrupt-
cy system, creditors may file proofs of claim to establish the existence of 
debts that the debtor owes to them.12 A claim is a “right to payment”13 or a 
“right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
gives rise to a right to payment.”14 Instead of proceeding with individual 
collection efforts, creditors generally must file a proof of claim to collect 
on pre-petition debts through the bankruptcy proceeding.15 Because the 
Bankruptcy Code explicitly permits the mere filing of a proof of claim, this 
filing does not violate the automatic stay even though such action could be 
interpreted as an effort to collect on a debt.  Once the creditor files a proof 
of claim, the underlying claim or claims are deemed allowed unless a party 
objects.16 If a party objects to a claim, the bankruptcy court must deter-
mine the amount and enforceability of that claim.17
Individual consumers can file for bankruptcy under chapters 7, 13, or 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to the Bankruptcy Abuse and Preven-
tion Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) amendments that tend to favor chapter 13.  
The chapters offer starkly different procedures: chapter 7 involves an im-
mediate liquidation of the debtor’s assets, whereas chapters 11 and 13 pro-
mote reorganization by requiring the debtor to draft a plan to repay 
creditors over a prolonged period of time.18 Instead of liquidating assets, 
chapter 13 allows debtors to retain their property because they can repay 
their debts from their regular income.19 This ability to retain property is 
one of the chief reasons a debtor may prefer to file for relief under chapter 
13 rather than chapter 7.
A. The Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Process
An individual debtor with regular income and consumer debt not ex-
ceeding certain statutory limits is eligible to file for relief under chapter 
11. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2016). The “automatic stay” is precisely that. It is a broad stay of proceed-
ings against the debtor that goes into effect automatically upon filing for bankruptcy relief. See id.
12. Id. § 501(a).
13. Id. § 101(5)(A).
14. Id. § 101(5)(B).
15. Id. § 501. “Pre-petition debts” refers to claims against the debtor which are blocked by the 
automatic stay because they arose at the time of or before the automatic stay went into effect. See id.
§ 362(a).
16. Id. § 502(a).
17. Id. § 502(b).
18. Differences between Chapters 7, 11, 12, & 13, GAMBRELL & ASSOCS., http://www.ms-
bankruptcy.com/bankruptcy-info/differences [http://perma.cc/A4ZN-MFAV].
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
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13.20 In many cases, though, a debtor might file for chapter 13 simply be-
cause he or she is ineligible for chapter 7.  When Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code with BAPCPA, it added a “means test” to determine the 
appropriate chapter under which a debtor could file.21 Congress imple-
mented this means test to combat the perceived threat of debtors seeking 
liquidation relief in bad faith without first considering a creditor repayment 
plan.22 Under BAPCPA, a debtor who appears to have sufficient debt-
repaying potential cannot seek a chapter 7 liquidation in good faith.23 As a 
result, BAPCPA requires debtors to file for chapter 13 when the statute 
deems that creditors could receive more from a debtor reorganization.24
To receive relief under chapter 13, the debtor must develop a bank-
ruptcy plan to repay his or her debts.25  Creditors prove the existence of 
these debts by filing claims with the bankruptcy court.26 The standard 
claim form includes enough information for the debtor to determine what 
debt the claim arises from, the amount of that debt, and whether that debt is 
enforceable.27 The debtor’s plan then must address each allowed, enforce-
able claim in the order that the Bankruptcy Code requires.28 If the bank-
ruptcy court approves the plan, the plan binds “the debtor and each 
creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the 
plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has 
rejected the plan.”29 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code creates an incentive for all 
creditors with claims to participate in the process.
The Bankruptcy Code allows debtors, trustees, and creditors to object 
to proofs of claim for debt that is unenforceable under nonbankruptcy law, 
such as debt that has expired under a state statute of limitations.30 The 
objection provisions thus implicitly recognize that a creditor might file a 
proof of claim for an unenforceable debt.  The bankruptcy process does 
20. Id. § 109(e).
21. Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, Esq., “Means Test” or “Just a Mean Test”: An Examina-
tion of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with Amended Section 
707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 413 (2008).
22. Id.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (requiring courts to presume a debtor’s bad faith where certain conditions 
are met).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1321.
26. Id. § 501.
27. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Official Form 410, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/proof-claim-0 [https://perma.cc/6H6U-SKUJ]. 
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
29. Id. § 1327(a).
30. See id. § 502(b)(1) (stating that a debtor can object to a claim if “such claim is unenforceable 
against the debtor . . . under . . . applicable law”).
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not, however, confer on creditors new substantive rights that would other-
wise be unenforceable outside of bankruptcy.31 Put differently, the debt-
or’s filing cannot transform an unenforceable debt into an enforceable 
one.32 For example, if a debt is unenforceable under a state statute of limi-
tations, a statute of limitations defense remains in effect even when the 
debtor is in bankruptcy.  Debtors rely on the objection provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code to protect themselves from paying improper claims.  
Ultimately, a debtor should pay only those claims that are allowed, en-
forceable, and accounted for in the bankruptcy plan.
B. The Economy of Debt Purchasing
The holders of claims in a bankruptcy need not be the original credi-
tors who contracted with the debtor.  Pursuant to this principle, the market 
for consumer debt purchasing is massive and affects millions of people.  In 
a 2013 study, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) observed nine leading 
debt purchasers in the United States over a three-year period.33 During that 
period, these debt purchasers bought more than 5000 portfolios, represent-
ing over 90 million consumer accounts and over $143 billion in consumer 
debt.34 The debt purchasers had acquired this debt for just under $6.5 bil-
lion, which exceeded more than three quarters of the debt sold in the Unit-
ed States during that time period.35 The FTC also noted an increase in 
consumer complaints as the debt purchasing industry increased.  In 2009 
alone, consumers filed over 27,000 complaints alleging that a debt pur-
chaser had falsely represented the character, amount, or status of a debt.36
Debt purchasers can buy debt at a significant discount if the debtor 
appears unlikely to pay or the underlying debt is unenforceable.  Generally, 
when the statute of limitations runs on a debt, the debt does not cease to 
exist under state law and can still be sold to third parties.37 The statute of 
limitations removes enforceability options, but does not extinguish the debt 
31. See generally Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
32. Id.
33. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1 n.5.
37. See, e.g., Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 734 (7th Cir. 2016). Interestingly, 
this is not the law throughout the Seventh Circuit. In Wisconsin, unlike in most states, some kinds of 
debts are extinguished when the statute of limitations runs. Bridgit Bowden, Controversial Debt Buyers 
Get a Break Under New Wisconsin Law, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Apr. 3, 2016), 
http://wisconsinwatch.org/2016/04/controversial-debt-buyers-get-a-break-under-new-wisconsin-law
[https://perma.cc/8MRL-4JRV].
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itself.38 Although the debtholder cannot pursue a cause of action to recov-
er, the debt still exists.  Thus, even time-barred debt can be sold albeit at a 
fraction of its face value.  On average, debt is sold for “4.0 cents per dollar 
of debt face value.”39 The older the debt, and thus the higher the risk of 
nonpayment, the cheaper the debt purchaser can buy it.40 By providing a 
backup option for creditors to receive payment, debt purchasing increases 
the value of debt and encourages creditors to continue extending credit.41
Both creditors and debt purchasers realize value from these transactions.
The creditor receives some payment, which is better than complete non-
payment, and the debt purchaser receives debt for much lower than its face 
value.  The challenge for debt purchasers becomes finding a way to get 
repaid for these high-risk debts, often within the confines of the bankruptcy 
system.
With chances of repayment in mind, debt purchasers tend to focus on 
chapter 13 debtors.  Debtors in chapter 7 bankruptcies are unlikely to be of 
any interest to these buyers because anyone getting into chapter 7 often has 
zero non-exempt assets and will come out with a full discharge.42 That is, 
purchasers of chapter 7 debt would often receive nothing through the bank-
ruptcy process.43 Debt purchasing works only in a chapter 13 case because 
the debtor is required to pay more toward debt claims over a longer period 
of time than they would in a chapter 7 case.  As a result, debt purchasers 
must be able to navigate the chapter 13 process effectively to collect their 
debts.
C. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
As the market for debt purchasing has grown, so has the need to police 
unfair or abusive debt collection practices.  In their efforts to collect on 
debts, debt purchasers must abide by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(the “FDCPA”).44 Congress enacted the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive 
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collec-
38. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-206 (2007) (indicating that no cause of action to recover 
on a debt can be brought in Illinois after a specified time period, but not that the underlying debt has 
been extinguished).
39. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at ii.
40. Id.
41. Id. at i (“Debt buying can reduce the losses that creditors incur in providing credit, thereby 
allowing creditors to provide more credit at lower prices.”).
42. Chapter 7 is unlikely to involve debtors with significant repayment potential or assets to 
retain, due to the “means test” and liquidation function of chapter 7 proceedings.
43. The only caveat is that the creditors might resist discharge on grounds in sections 523 or 
727—but that is a huge cost that debt purchases likely will not want. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (2016).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2015).
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tors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not com-
petitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect 
consumers against debt collection abuses.”45 Debt collectors can violate 
the FDCPA by using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or 
means” to collect a debt.  The FDCPA sets forth non-exhaustive examples 
of conduct that violates this prohibition, including misrepresenting the legal 
status of any debt46 and using false representations or deceptive means to 
attempt to collect a debt.47 Further, the FDCPA forbids a debt collector 
from using unfair or unconscionable means to attempt to collect any debt.48
The FDCPA provides debtors with a cause of action against debt col-
lectors who violate its provisions.  To state a plausible FDCPA claim, a 
plaintiff must sufficiently allege that the defendant is a debt collector who 
sought to collect a consumer debt in a manner prohibited by the statute.49
If the plaintiff wins on his or her FDCPA claim, the court can award actual 
damages, plus additional damages up to $1000.50 The FDCPA imposes 
strict liability so plaintiffs can pursue an FDCPA claim even if they suffer 
no actual injury as a result of the alleged statutory violation.51
The standard by which courts determine whether a debt collector’s ac-
tions violated the FDCPA in a given case is largely fact-dependent.  Gener-
ally, circuit courts have applied a “least sophisticated consumer” or an 
“unsophisticated consumer” standard.52 The Seventh Circuit held in Phil-
lips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC that the filing of a civil action against a con-
sumer to recover a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA.53 In finding so, 
the court established that the FDCPA prohibits actions of debt collectors 
that would have deceived the “unsophisticated consumer.”54 The “unso-
phisticated consumer” standard evaluates alleged violations of the FDCPA 
under the assumption that a communication or practice is deceptive if “a 
person of modest education and limited commercial savvy would be likely 
to be deceived” by it.55
45. Id. § 1692(e).
46. Id. § 1692e(2)(A).
47. Id. § 1692e(10).
48. Id. § 1692f.
49. Kang v. Eisenstein, 962 F. Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)–(2).
51. Id. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); see also Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (“Proof of injury is not required when the only damages sought are statutory.”).
52. See Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1258–61 (11th Cir. 2014).
53. 736 F.3d at 1079.
54. Id.
55. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Olson 
v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc., 366 F.3d 509, 512–13 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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Alternatively, some courts evaluate representations made to a debtor’s 
attorney on a “competent lawyer” standard.56 Under this standard, if a 
communication would deceive or mislead a competent attorney, then the 
communication is deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA.  In 
Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit determined 
that communications to a debtor’s attorney were significantly different 
from communications to a debtor for purposes of establishing FDCPA 
claims.57 Specifically, “communications to a consumer’s lawyer are 
judged by a different standard: a communication ‘that would be unlikely to
deceive a competent lawyer . . . [is] not . . . actionable.’”58 This standard 
therefore provides a higher bar of scrutiny against FDCPA claims.  Deter-
mining whether to apply the “least sophisticated consumer” standard from 
Phillips or the “competent lawyer” standard from Evory to proofs of claim 
in bankruptcy has been crucial to FDCPA jurisprudence.
D. The Splintered Jurisprudence of the FDCPA and Debtors in
Bankruptcy
Before courts can determine which FDCPA standard applies to proofs 
of claim, they must first decide whether the FDCPA provides remedies to 
debtors in bankruptcy at all.  Debt collection practices are inevitably rele-
vant in bankruptcy cases, but circuit courts are split over whether the 
FDCPA applies to debt collectors’ actions within the bankruptcy process. 59
The Second,60 Eighth,61 and Ninth62 Circuits have determined that remedies 
under the FDCPA are unavailable to debtors in bankruptcy whereas the 
Third,63 Seventh,64 and Eleventh65 Circuits have not precluded applying 
FDCPA relief in such cases.
56. Id. at 775.
57. Id.
58. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-02083-JMS-TAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52680, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2015), aff’d, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Evory, 505 F.3d at 
775).
59. Compare Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002), and Simmons v. 
Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), with Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th 
Cir. 2004), and Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013), and Crawford v. LVNV 
Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
60. Simmons, 622 F.3d at 96.
61. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 2158 (2017).
62. Walls, 276 F.3d at 510.
63. Simon, 732 F.3d at 274.
64. Randolph, 368 F.3d at 732.
65. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014).
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In Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the availability of remedies in 
the Bankruptcy Code precluded debtors in bankruptcy from seeking reme-
dies through the FDCPA.66 The debtor in Walls pursued an FDCPA action, 
alleging that her creditor had collected on debt that had been discharged 
through bankruptcy.67 The court pointed out that the Bankruptcy Code
already offered remedies for violations of bankruptcy’s discharge provi-
sions.68 Using its equitable powers, a bankruptcy court could find a credi-
tor in contempt and order sanctions or damages accordingly.69 Although 
the FDCPA is meant to help debtors avoid bankruptcy, “if bankruptcy nev-
ertheless occurs, the debtor’s protection and remedy remain under the 
Bankruptcy Code.”70 Thus, allowing a separate private cause of action 
under the FDCPA would be unnecessary and improper.71
The Second Circuit adopted a similar approach in Simmons v. Round-
up Funding, LLC.72 In Simmons, the debt collector misrepresented through 
its proof of claim the amount that the debtor owed.73 In the Second Cir-
cuit’s view, filing an inflated proof of claim did not form the basis of an 
FDCPA claim because the Bankruptcy Code already provided a remedial 
scheme for fraudulent or defective proofs of claim.74 If a creditor filed 
such a proof of claim, then the bankruptcy court could find that creditor in 
contempt of court or revoke a fraudulently obtained order.75 Thus, the 
court concluded that as a matter of law “the filing a proof of claim in bank-
ruptcy court cannot form the basis for an FDCPA claim.”76 The Eighth 
Circuit also adopted this logic.77
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a dual compliance 
view of the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.  That is, “as long as people 
can comply with both, then courts can enforce both.”78 In Randolph v. 
IMBS, Inc., the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that these two statutes can 
66. Walls, 276 F.3d at 511.
67. Id. at 505.
68. Id. at 510.
69. Id. at 506–07 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)).
70. Id. at 510 (citing Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 (1974)).
71. Id. at 510–11.
72. See 622 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
73. Id. at 95.
74. Id. at 96.
75. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1330).
76. Id.
77. See Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).
78. Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2004).
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coexist.79  The court noted that “[i]t takes either irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the statutes or a clearly expressed legislative decision that one re-
place the other.”80 The differences between the statutes does not add up to 
an irreconcilable conflict because debt collectors can easily comply with 
both.81 Thus, the overlapping statutes do not repeal one another by impli-
cation and a debtor in bankruptcy is not precluded from seeking FDCPA 
relief.82
The Third Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit’s view in Simon v. FIA 
Card Services, N.A.83 In Simon, the joint debtors received letters and a 
subpoena from a debt collector shortly after they filed for bankruptcy pro-
tection.84 The communications indicated that the debt collector was con-
sidering disputing a discharge of the debtors’ credit card debt and was 
offering to settle.85 The debtors then sued the creditor, alleging that the 
communications violated the FDCPA.86 First, the court had to consider 
whether the Bankruptcy Code or rules precluded FDCPA remedies:
When . . . FDCPA claims arise from communications a debt collector 
sends a bankruptcy debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding, and the 
communications are alleged to violate the Bankruptcy Code or Rules, 
there is no categorical preclusion of the FDCPA claims. When . . . the 
FDCPA claim arises from communications sent in a pending bankruptcy 
proceeding and there is no allegation that the communications violate the 
Code or Rules, there is even less reason for categorical preclusion. The 
proper inquiry for both circumstances is whether the FDCPA claim rais-
es a direct conflict between the Code or Rules and the FDCPA, or 
whether both can be enforced.87
The court went on to indicate that debt collectors can comply with 
both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA.88 As a result, the remedies 
available in bankruptcy court do “not conflict with finding liability or 
awarding damages under the FDCPA for violations based on a debt collec-
tor’s failure to comply” with that court’s rules.89
The Randolph and Simon decisions thus set the stage for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s highly controversial 
79. Id. at 730–31.
80. Id. at 730.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 732 F.3d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2013).
84. Id. at 262.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 263.
87. Id. at 274.
88. Id. at 279.
89. Id.
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decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC.90 The court in Crawford
found not only that Bankruptcy Code remedies could co-exist with FDCPA 
damages, but also that the mere filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy 
could trigger FDCPA liability.91 Specifically, filing a proof of claim for 
time-barred debt can violate sections 1692e and 1692f of the FDCPA.92
The court in Crawford suggested that there was essentially no difference 
between a debt collector filing a stale lawsuit in state court and one filing a 
stale proof of claim in bankruptcy.93 As a result, a time-barred debt collec-
tor has violated the FDCPA if its actions in bankruptcy would give the 
“least-sophisticated consumer” the false impression that the debt is en-
forceable.94
E. Post-Crawford Chaos in the Seventh Circuit
Where the circuits had already been split on whether the FDCPA 
could apply to debt collection practices in bankruptcy at all, Crawford
quickly splintered FDCPA jurisprudence even further.  Although the Sev-
enth Circuit was aligned with the Eleventh Circuit that the FDCPA could 
apply to debt collectors in bankruptcy, actual application of the FDCPA 
proved an additional challenge.  Bankruptcy courts and district courts in the 
Seventh Circuit struggled to apply the FDCPA consistently.  Specifically, 
whether a creditor merely filing a claim for time-barred debt could consti-
tute an FDCPA violation became another major point of disagreement.  
Some courts held that asserting a time-barred claim in a bankruptcy case 
cannot violate the FDCPA as a matter of law.95 Other courts concluded 
that filing a stale proof of claim can violate the FDCPA.96
90. See 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
91. Id. at 1262.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1260–61.
94. Id. (citing Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013)).
95. See, e.g., Birtchman v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-713-JMS-TAB, 2015 WL 1825970 
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 2015); Donaldson v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (S.D. Ind. 2015); 
Robinson v. eCast Settlement Corp., No. 14 CV 8277, 2015 WL 494626 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2015); Murff 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Murff), Ch. 13 Case No. 13 B 44431, Adv. No. 14 A 790, 2015 WL 
3690994 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 15, 2015); Lagrone v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Lagrone), 525 B.R. 
419 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
96. See, e.g., Taylor v. Galaxy Asset Purchasing, LLC, 108 F. Supp. 3d 628 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 
2015); Taylor v. Midland Funding, LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d 941 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2015); Patrick v. 
Worldwide Asset Purchasing II, LLC, No. 1:14–cv–00544–TWP–TAB, 2015 WL 627376 (S.D. Ind. 
Feb. 13, 2015); Grandidier v. Quantum3 Group, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00138-RLY, 2014 WL 6908482 
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2014); Patrick v. Pyod, LLC, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Edwards v. 
LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Edwards), 539 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015); Avalos v. LVNV Fund-
ing, LLC (In re Avalos), 531 B.R. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015); Brimmage v. Quantum3 Group, LLC (In 
re Brimmage), 523 B.R. 134 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
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In Patrick v. Pyod, LLC, the first post-Crawford decision within the 
Seventh Circuit regarding this issue, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana followed Crawford and held that filing a proof 
of claim for a time-barred debt could give rise to an FDCPA claim.97 The 
overlap in coverage between the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA did not 
preclude the application of both statutes because as “long as ‘people can 
comply with both, then courts can enforce both.’”98 Because the FDCPA 
could apply, the court found Crawford particularly persuasive.99 A proof 
of claim for time-barred debt would confuse the “least sophisticated con-
sumer,” so the proof of claim was “unfair,” “unconscionable,” “deceptive,” 
and “misleading” under FDCPA sections 1692e and 1692f.100
In Brimmage v. Quantum3 Group, LLC (In re Brimmage), Judge 
Jacqueline P. Cox, writing for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, followed the dual compliance test set forth in 
Randolph and Pyod.101 Because a debt collector could comply with both 
the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA, the FDCPA could apply to proofs of 
claim despite “a series of cases from other jurisdictions which have held 
[otherwise].”102 As such, although the Bankruptcy Code “may allow [debt 
collectors] to file a proof of claim on a time-barred [debt], it does not re-
lieve them of their obligation to comply with the FDCPA.”103 Judge Cox 
also noted that “the filing of a proof of claim is merely the bankruptcy ana-
log of filing a complaint or sending a demand letter to recover on a debt 
outside of bankruptcy.”104
Less than two weeks later, Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, also writing for 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
disagreed with Judge Cox’s decision.105 Judge Wedoff held that “filing a 
proof of claim on a debt subject to a limitation defense” could not violate 
the FDCPA.106 In Lagrone v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Lagrone), Judge 
Wedoff agreed that the FDCPA could be applied to proofs of claim in 
bankruptcy cases but disagreed with the Crawford analysis, finding that 
97. 39 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1036 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
98. Id. at 1034 (quoting Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 2004)).
99. Id. at 1035–36.
100. Id. at 1036 (citing Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 
2014)).
101. Brimmage v. Quantum3 Group, LLC (In re Brimmage), 523 B.R. 134, 138–39 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2015).
102. Id. at 138.
103. Id. at 141.
104. Id. at 138.
105. Lagrone v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Lagrone), 525 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015).
106. Id.
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lawsuits filed against individuals are sufficiently different from proofs of 
claim filed in bankruptcy cases.107 Four key differences between lawsuits 
and proofs of claim indicated that the inherent deception of untimely law-
suits is not present in bankruptcy cases.108
First, debtors in collection lawsuits must assert statute of limitations 
defenses themselves, whereas debtors in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases have 
trustees looking out for debtor and creditor interests.109 Second, a debtor in 
bankruptcy has less at stake in allowing a proof of claim for a time-barred 
debt than a debtor in a collection lawsuit.110 Under a chapter 13 plan, debt-
ors often elect to pay less than the full sum of the claims against them, 
meaning that the debtor will pay the same amount regardless of whether 
particular proofs of claim are disallowed.111  Third, an FDCPA-protected 
debtor brought into a collection lawsuit would have to hire legal counsel; 
debtors engaged in the bankruptcy process are often represented by an at-
torney and are therefore much less likely to be uninformed regarding unen-
forceable debt.112
Finally, proofs of claim for time-barred debt necessarily provide the 
debtor with all of the information required to form an objection, whereas a 
state court complaint might not.113 As a result, “it would be easier—and 
less embarrassing—for the individual debtor to file a claim objection pro se 
than to deal with an untimely collection lawsuit.”114 Judge Wedoff con-
cluded that because the issues a consumer faces in defending an untimely 
“collection lawsuit . . . are not raised by untimely proofs of claims, there is 
no reason to interpret the FDCPA as having the same effect on bankruptcy 
claims that it has on civil actions.”115
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECIDES OWENS VS. LVNV FUNDING
Facing an ample amount of irreconcilable case law, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit resolved the intra-circuit chaos in Owens v. 
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (applicable in chapter 13 under § 1302(b)(1))); see also In re
Andreas, 373 B.R. 864, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (“[T]he Trustee is a fiduciary owing duties to all 
parties in interest in a Chapter 13 case.”); In re Mid–States Express, Inc., 433 B.R. 688, 697 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2010) (“The trustee has a duty to object to improper claims.”).
110. In re Lagrone, 525 B.R. at 426.
111. Id. at 427.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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LVNV Funding, LLC.  Alphonse Owens filed his chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Indiana.116 In
his petition, he listed as a creditor LVNV Funding, LLC, a debt purchaser 
who had purchased Owens’ consumer debt from an original creditor.117
LVNV filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court and provided in-
formation sufficient to establish that the underlying debt was unenforceable 
under Indiana’s statute of limitations for collecting debt.118
Owens, represented by counsel throughout his bankruptcy case, ob-
jected to LVNV’s proof of claim on the ground that Indiana’s statute of 
limitations precluded enforcement of that debt obligation.119 The bank-
ruptcy court sustained Owens’s objection and dismissed the claim.120 Ow-
ens then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana, seeking statutory damages against LVNV.121
The complaint alleged that LVNV violated provisions of the FDCPA that 
prohibit “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in 
connection with the collection of any debt”122 and the use of “unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”123
The district court dismissed the complaint on LVNV’s motion.124
Owens then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which consolidated his appeal 
with two appeals from cases with similar facts.125
The Seventh Circuit had to resolve two separate issues.  First, the con-
solidated plaintiffs argued that “the act of filing a proof of claim on a time-
barred debt is inherently misleading because ‘claim’ is defined to include 
only legally enforceable obligations.”126 Second, the plaintiffs contended 
that filing a stale proof of claim is practically deceptive because it would 
116. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-02083-JMS-TAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52680, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2015), aff’d, 832 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2016).
117. Id. LVNV often litigated this issue and was regularly a defendant in FDCPA lawsuits regard-
ing proofs of claim for stale debts. See Simon, 732 F.3d 259 at 263, 274.
118. Owens, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52680, at *3.
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *1.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
123. Id. § 1692f.
124. Owens, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52680, at *1.
125. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Robinson v. 
eCast Settlement Corp., No. 14 CV 8277, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176022 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2015); 
Birtchman v. LVNV Funding, No. 1:14-cv-713-JMS-TAB, 32015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52669 (S.D. Ind., 
Apr. 22, 2015).
126. Owens, 832 F.3d at 730.
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succeed only when the debtor and his attorney fail to object.127 Ultimately, 
both of these arguments failed.128
The court first rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that LVNV violated the 
FDCPA by filing a proof of claim for stale debt because “the term ‘claim’ 
[in the Bankruptcy Code] includes only legally enforceable obligations.”129
Because bankruptcy is intended to be all-encompassing, courts interpret 
“claim” very broadly to ensure that all relevant claims against the debtor 
are processed within a collective proceeding.130  After all, only debts 
brought to the court’s attention can be discharged.131 The Bankruptcy 
Code defines a “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, 
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unse-
cured[.]”132 This definition includes several rights to payment that are not 
yet enforceable, including unmatured and contingent rights.133 The Bank-
ruptcy Code therefore anticipates that creditors may file a claim for unen-
forceable debt and provides procedures for processing such claims.134
According to the court, a claim for unenforceable debt does not falsely 
cloak that debt with an air of legitimacy, it simply purports to be a claim 
subject to dispute in the bankruptcy.135 If the definition of a “claim” in-
cludes claims for unenforceable debts, then filing such a claim could not be 
inherently misleading.136
The plaintiffs next contended that, in practice, LVNV’s behavior was 
deceptive because its success depends on a break-down of the bankruptcy 
process.137 Essentially, LVNV could get paid on its claim only when the 
trustee, the debtor, and the debtor’s attorney all fail to object where object-
ing would be appropriate.138 LVNV’s business model thus relies on flood-
ing courts with claims for time-barred debt to overwhelm the systems in 
place, which the plaintiffs argued was unacceptably deceptive under the 
FDCPA.139 If the “system functions as intended,” these claims would be 
127. Id.
128. Id. at 737.
129. Id. at 730.
130. Id. at 732.
131. Id.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2016).
133. Owens, 832 F.3d at 730.
134. Id. at 732 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 558).
135. Id. at 734.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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immediately dismissed because the statute of limitations provides “an iron-
clad affirmative defense” to them.140 The court took issue with this argu-
ment partly because the statute of limitations running on a debt does not 
terminate the debt nor does it prohibit all avenues of collection.141 The 
court held that the claim was not deceptive because LVNV was accurate 
and thorough with the information it provided, Owens had legal counsel, 
and the claim would not have deceived a competent attorney.142
The court ultimately ruled against the plaintiff but left open the possi-
bility that LVNV’s practices could run afoul of the FDCPA in a future case 
where the debtor was not represented by an attorney.143 In Owens, the 
plaintiffs were each represented by an attorney who objected to LVNV’s 
claim and the claims were dismissed without being paid.144 Relying on its 
decision in Evory, the court used its “competent lawyer” standard to deter-
mine that LVNV’s claim was not facially deceptive.145 That is, a compe-
tent attorney would, and in fact did, know that the claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations.  This holding thus does not foreclose all FDCPA 
liability in bankruptcy cases involving time-barred debt.  For example, 
Owens would not prohibit a future pro se debtor from bringing an FDCPA 
action for filing a time-barred proof of claim.  If the debtor was not repre-
sented by an attorney, the “least sophisticated consumer” standard from 
Phillips would apply and the court’s analysis would have to change.146
Unconvinced that the FDCPA should permit LVNV’s behavior, Chief 
Judge Diane Wood vigorously dissented from the court’s decision.147 First,
Judge Wood clarified that “[s]ome things are too speculative, or too much 
against public policy, to include” in section 101(5)(A)’s definition of a 
140. Oral Argument at 0:32, Owens, LLC, 832 F.3d 726 (No. 15-2044), 
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2016/sp.15-2044.15-2044_06_01_2016.mp3
[https://perma.cc/9T8X-6E6R]. At oral arguments, counsel for the debtor further argued that being 
subject to an iron-clad affirmative defense meant that claims for stale debts were additionally sanction-
able under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Id. at 1:40 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011).
141. Owens, 832 F.3d at 731; see also McMahon v. LVNV Funding, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 
2014) (holding that it is not “automatically improper for a debt collector to seek re-payment of time-
barred debts.”).
142. Owens, 832 F.3d at 736–37.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 735–37. It is hard to imagine when this scenario could realistically play out. Assuming 
that the Bankruptcy Code’s protections have broken down, these claims sneak their way into the debt-
or’s plan, which the court unknowingly confirms. How often would an unsophisticated consumer debtor 
realize, without legal representation, that they are paying an unenforceable claim as part of their court-
confirmed bankruptcy plan?
147. See id. at 737 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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claim.148 For example, a claim for fraudulent debt would not be acceptable 
in a bankruptcy case so it is reasonable that a claim for stale debt should 
not be either.149 Judge Wood next highlighted that LVNV likely violates 
Federal Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 9011 every time it files one of its
proofs of claim for time-barred debt.150 Under Rule 9011, the act of filing 
a proof of claim “[certifies] that to the best of [the filer’s] knowledge, in-
formation, and belief . . . the claims . . . are warranted by existing law.”151
Therefore, filing is sanctionable when the claim is for debt that is not en-
forceable under applicable law and subject to an ironclad affirmative de-
fense.152 Because a court should never condone or “protect frivolous, bad-
faith, or unfounded claims,” sanctionable claims should not be welcome in 
bankruptcy.153 Accordingly, filing a sanctionable proof of claim should be 
punishable under the FDCPA.154
Judge Wood also criticized LVNV’s argument that a debtor still has a 
moral obligation to repay a debt even where the debt is unenforceable.155
Although such a moral obligation might actually exist, “a proof of claim is 
no mere request on moral grounds . . . it is a legal mechanism through 
which the payment of that claim can be compelled.”156 Because the statute 
of limitations provides an absolute bar against stale claims, then time-
barred debt is not collectible and does not need to be discharged.157 Stat-
utes of limitations sever legal avenues to collect the debt such that a time-
barred debt cannot be enforced in a legal proceeding, even if the debt still 
technically exists under state law.158 The disagreement between Judge 
Wood and the Owens majority highlights most of the relevant points that 
the Supreme Court of the United States would need to address upon review 
of this issue.
148. Id. at 739.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(b).
152. See id.
153. Owens, 832 F.3d at 739 (Wood, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 739–41.
155. Id. at 740.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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III. FILING TIME-BARRED PROOFS OF CLAIM VIOLATES THE FDCPA
The Owens decision contributes to a circuit split on this issue; the 
Seventh Circuit put itself squarely at odds with the Eleventh Circuit.159
This split means that the issue of whether a chapter 13 proof of claim for a 
time-barred debt violates the FDCPA is ripe for review by the Supreme 
Court. Despite the split and need for resolution, however, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the Owens case.160 For now, the Owens decision 
will stand, but circuits undecided on this issue should decline to follow it.
First, the Seventh Circuit found that the definition of a “claim” in sec-
tion 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code included claims for time-barred 
debts because it also included other types of unenforceable rights to pay-
ment.  Although the definition of “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is un-
questionably broad, the majority’s view ignores the fact that none of the 
rights to payment enumerated in the statute are unenforceable in the same 
way that time-barred debt is unenforceable.  If a debt is “contingent,” the 
debt is unenforceable but can become enforceable upon the occurrence of 
some triggering event determined before the debtor petitioned for bank-
ruptcy.  If a debt is “unmatured,” again the debt is currently unenforceable
but can mature and become enforceable in the future based on pre-petition 
arrangements.  If unmatured or contingent rights to payment were not in-
cluded in the bankruptcy process, then those debts would inevitably be-
come enforceable against the debtor outside of bankruptcy.  Keeping them 
out of the proceeding would defeat the whole point of bankruptcy.
Time-barred debt, on the other hand, is unenforceable and will not be-
come enforceable again without some intentional action by the debtor to 
revive the debt.161 Although stale debt can be revived under state law, the 
revival mechanism distinguishes time-barred debt from unmatured or con-
tingent debt.  Time-barred debt can become enforceable only by a post-
petition agreement to revive the debt rather than upon terms established 
pre-petition.  In other words, at the time of the bankruptcy petition, expired 
debt would remain unenforceable whether the bankruptcy process sorts it 
out or not.  If time-barred debt is left outside the bankruptcy process, noth-
ing would change—the debtor would still not be legally obligated to pay.  
If unmatured or contingent debt were left outside of bankruptcy, then those 
159. Id. at 735.
160. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (mem.).
161. There are very specific circumstances where expired debt can be revived under Illinois and 
Indiana law, but this revival typically requires an agreement in writing. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-
206 (2007) (indicating that expired debt obligations can be revived in Illinois) and IND. CODE § 34-11-
9-1 (2016) (indicating that expired debt obligations can be revived in Indiana).
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debts could become enforceable against the debtor based on pre-petition 
agreements without further debtor action to intentionally revive them.  
Thus, the definition of a “claim” within the Bankruptcy Code should not 
include all kinds of unenforceable debt merely because it includes some 
kinds.  Because an expired right to payment is significantly distinguishable 
from unmatured and contingent rights to payment, a claim for debt that 
cannot become enforceable again is outside the scope of section 
101(5)(A)’s definition.
Thus, courts should not foreclose FDCPA liability when a creditor 
files a claim for a debt that falls outside of 101(5)(A)’s definition.  Not 
every time a creditor files a claim for stale debt should merit FDCPA liabil-
ity, though.  In cases where there is a good faith argument regarding the 
enforceability of the debt, the filing would not be sanctionable under Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9001 because “it is possible to imagine a state of affairs in 
which a legally enforceable obligation exists.”162 Therefore, a bankruptcy 
court could disallow the claim, as anticipated by the Bankruptcy Code, 
without rendering the filer liable for damages under the FDCPA.163  In the 
debt purchaser scheme described in this Note, there is no question that the 
debt is unenforceable and stale.  By filing a proof of claim anyway, the 
debt purchaser has engaged in deceptive and misleading practices that 
should violate the FDCPA.  If the debt purchaser is unaware of the stale-
ness of the debt or can pose some argument why the debt is not stale, it 
would be a different situation.
Although section 101(5)(A) defines a “claim” exceptionally broadly, 
interpreting this definition to exclude time-barred debt is appropriate in 
light of the reason for that broadness.  Courts read the meaning of “claim” 
exceptionally broadly to further ‘the overriding goal of the Bankruptcy 
Code to provide a “fresh start” for the debtor.’”164 Debtors receive a fresh 
start only when they schedule all of their debts and discharge them through 
the bankruptcy process.165 By attaching FDCPA liability to creditors who 
file their claims for stale debt, the courts would be keeping these creditors 
out of the collective proceeding, arguably contrary to the purpose of bank-
ruptcy.  The debt exists and would exist in perpetuity because it could nev-
er be discharged.
162. Owens, 832 F.3d at 739–40 (Wood, J., dissenting).
163. See id.
164. In re Morgan, 197 B.R. 892, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Corman v. Morgan, 131 
F.3d 147 (9th Cir. 1997).
165. Consolidated Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellees at 10-11, Owens, 832 F.3d 726 
(No. 15-02044).
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In a general sense, filing a proof of claim aids the debtor’s fresh 
start—that is, if a creditor does not file its proof of claim then the debtor 
could never be free from the underlying debt.166 But this argument strains 
credulity when it comes to stale debts.  A debtor does not have to worry 
about a discharge for a debt they no longer legally owe, which is exactly 
what the statute of limitations running out means.  “Time-barred debts do 
not impose financial stress, and there is no need for legal relief from ‘moral 
obligations.’  The true ‘irony’ [in these cases is the debt purchasers’] at-
tempt to add a financial burden in a process designed to reduce consumer 
debt.”167  Obviously, this debt purchasing scheme is not actually about 
helping debtors with their fresh starts.  If the creditor’s true purpose was 
aiding the debtor’s fresh start, the creditor could better achieve that end by 
refraining from pursuing the claim at all rather than filing a proof of claim 
for an unenforceable debt and hoping that no one notices.  Then, there 
would be no non-bankruptcy collection efforts or illegitimate proofs of 
claim to object to.
Furthermore, even if a debtor has some moral obligation to repay a 
debt, this is not sufficient justification to include a time-barred right to 
payment in the definition of a claim.  Moral obligations simply cannot be 
read into a statute addressing legal rights to payment, particularly when 
payment on that obligation would harm creditors with actual legal rights to 
payment.  The more money that the plan designates for time-barred credi-
tors, the less money there would available to the plan’s remaining creditors.  
Thus, even if a debtor wanted to repay a debt pursuant to a moral obliga-
tion, a trustee would be perfectly within its duty to object to such repay-
ment on behalf of the legal creditors.
In addition to its strained reading of the word “claim,” the Seventh 
Circuit also erred in its promotion of a “competent attorney” standard in 
these cases.  Essentially, the court determined that filing a proof of claim 
for expired debt is not misleading because the information on the claim is 
accurate and sufficient for a competent attorney to know to object.  Alt-
hough the Owens court left open the possibility that LVNV’s practice could 
violate the FDCPA in cases involving pro se debtors,168 the scheme merits 
FDCPA liability regardless of whether the debtor is represented.  The 
“competent attorney” standard ignores the reality that the whole scheme 
relies on flooding the system with claims.  Each proof of claim does not 
166. See id.
167. Consolidated Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 25 n.9, Owens, 832 F.3d 726 (No. 15-
02044).
168. See Owens, 832 F.3d at 737.
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exist in a vacuum; the scheme works only when there are lots of claims in 
lots of cases.  Thus, FDCPA liability should attach to any claims for stale 
debt subject to ironclad affirmative defenses, not just the ones filed in cases 
with unrepresented debtors.  This expansion of liability is particularly im-
portant considering that debtors go unrepresented by an attorney in up to 
10% of chapter 13 cases.169 In those cases, debtors are significantly less 
protected against these claims.  If a time-barred claim slips through the 
cracks, a pro se debtor is much less likely to ever catch it and pursue an 
FDCPA claim.  Plus, even if debtors do have legal representation in their 
cases, the scope of that representation may not always include reviewing 
and objecting to individual proofs of claim.170 By allowing debt purchasers 
to flood the system without liability, unrepresented debtors are inevitably 
harmed if the scheme is permitted to continue.
The Owens holding also inappropriately flips the burden of weeding 
out these unenforceable claims onto the debtors’ lawyers, the trustee, and 
the bankruptcy courts, whereas the debt purchasers are in the best position 
to keep the system unclogged.  Trustees and bankruptcy courts are already 
overwhelmed with the massive volume of claims in chapter 13 cases.171
Weeding out unenforceable claims adds an unnecessary drain on judicial 
and party energy, increases administrative costs, and wastes hundreds of 
hours litigating.  The filing creditors could prevent these issues because 
they are professionals who know that their debt is expired.  Their incentive 
does not lie in prevention, though; the scheme relies on flooding the system 
and hoping some claims fall through the cracks.  It is therefore in the debt 
purchasers’ best interest to waste the trustee’s and the court’s time because 
the more flooded the system is, the more likely that these claims will get 
paid.  As their practice benefits only the debt purchasers at the expense of 
everyone else in the process, they have no interest in alleviating anyone 
else’s burdens.  Because they have no interest in doing so, one way to en-
courage debt purchasers to stop obfuscating the system would be FDCPA 
liability.
Had the Supreme Court overturned Owens, it would have come with 
some notable consequences.  For example, courts holding that filing time-
barred claims violates the FDCPA would significantly impair the market 
for stale debt.  Debt already loses value over time, as older debt sells for 
169. Consolidated Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 167, at 5.
170. Id.
171. See Feggins v. LVNV Funding LLC, No. 13-11319-WRS, 2015 WL 7424339, at *3 n.5 
(Bankr. M.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2015) (trustee “testified that his office processes between 6,000 and 7,000 
claims each month, and that there are between 18,000 and 19,000 pending Chapter 13 cases in [his] 
district”).
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much less than newer debt.172  Increased risk of non-repayment lowers the 
debt’s value.173 Adding more FDCPA hurdles in bankruptcy would make 
time-barred debt even more difficult to collect on and entirely reliant on the 
debtor’s choice to repay. This increased difficulty would decrease both the 
value of this debt and the incentive to buy it, and the downstream benefits 
of debt purchasing diminish.  When potential buyers know that they stand 
little chance to collect, creditors would probably be less likely to sell these 
debts.  The increased possibility of original creditors being stuck with 
worthless debt would, in turn, likely raise the price of credit for future bor-
rowers.174
FDCPA remedies for merely filing a proof of claim might also create 
the opportunity for debtors to take advantage of debt collectors in the bank-
ruptcy process.  For example, when the debtor lists the time-barred debt 
owed to the debt collector in his schedules, he invites the debt collector to 
file a proof of claim.  The debt collector mistakenly believes that the debtor 
will pay, files its proof of claim, and then is met with an FDCPA claim for 
damages.  Such a situation might result from either mistake by the parties 
or, even worse, invidious attempts by the debtor and the debtor’s attorney 
to try to secure an additional windfall for his client.  In a world where 
FDCPA claims are allowed against time-barred proofs of claim, a debtor 
might be incentivized “to ignore the procedural safeguards within the 
Bankruptcy Code, such as the right to object to proofs of claim and to seek 
sanctions against creditors who violate provisions within the Bankruptcy 
Code, in favor of the FDCPA.”175 Realistically, though, such risks do not 
exist.  First, a professional debt purchaser would know that filing for an 
expired debt would open them up to FDCPA liability even if it seemed like 
the debtor encouraged them.  Second, FDCPA proceeds would not actually 
result in a windfall for the debtor; instead, they would likely be vested in 
the debtor’s estate or the basis for increased plan payments.176 Since a filer 
of a proof of claim for time-barred debt attempted to divert money from 
legitimate creditors, it is a perfectly reasonable punishment to require that 
filer to pay back into the estate.
When debt purchasers do not face repercussions for abusing the bank-
ruptcy system to revive their stale debts, it creates an incentive to drive 
172. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at ii.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Middlebrooks v. Interstate Credit Control, Inc., 391 B.R. 434, 437 (D. Minn. 2008) (internal 
quotations omitted).
176. See Avalos v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Avalos), 531 B.R. 748, 750–51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2015).
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debtors into bankruptcy.  Treating “creditors differently depending on 
which enforcement mechanism they use invites troublesome forum shop-
ping.”177  As a result, bankruptcy law generally respects parties’ pre-
bankruptcy positions to avoid such incentives.178 Attempts to collect time-
barred debt outside of bankruptcy are unquestionably subject to the 
FDCPA.  Once the debtor files for bankruptcy, that previously unenforcea-
ble debt now has a chance to be paid off if the claim avoids objection.179
Thus, a debt collector would have a better-than-nothing chance to collect 
through the bankruptcy process on debt that would be unenforceable out-
side of bankruptcy.  If the FDCPA does not deter filing stale proofs of 
claim, this chance arises without any downside or repercussion.  Immuniz-
ing filers of time-barred proofs of claim from FDCPA liability therefore 
puts debt collectors in a better position to collect when the debtor is in 
bankruptcy than when the debtor is not.  As a result, not punishing filers of 
stale proofs of claim would create the unacceptable incentive to drive debt-
ors into bankruptcy.
Additionally, the faith that some judges have placed in the Bankruptcy 
Code’s protections is misplaced.  Debt purchasers, like LVNV, have de-
signed a business model that relies on the predictable failure of these pro-
tections.  Thus, any success in collecting on stale debts demonstrates that 
these protections are practically inefficient because trustees’ offices face 
thousands of claims with limited time and resources,180 and debtors’ attor-
ney representation often stops short of objecting to claims.181  The scheme 
works only when the trustee and the debtor’s counsel fail to object when 
they should have.  The FDCPA provides a necessary backstop to curb abu-
sive debt collector behavior where these processes break down.  By con-
cluding that the FDCPA should not provide a remedy to debtors in 
bankruptcy, courts remove this backstop and open the bankruptcy system 
up for abuse.
Ultimately, because the Supreme Court has refused to reverse Owens,
the confusion over whether FDCPA prohibits filing proofs of claim for 
stale debts could be resolved by Congress or by state legislatures.  Con-
gress could simply add knowingly filing a proof of claim for stale debt or 
177. Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987).
178. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979) (indicating that courts “should take whatever 
steps are necessary to ensure that [a creditor is] afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection 
[he] would have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued”).
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (allowing claims unless they are objected to).
180. See Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 737 (7th Cir. 2016).
181. See Consolidated Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 167.
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committing an act that is sanctionable under Rule 9011 as a specifically 
disallowed practice under the FDCPA.  Congress could also amend the 
Bankruptcy Code to clarify that time-barred rights to payment fall outside 
section 101(5)(A)’s definition of a “claim.”  Finally, state legislatures could 
follow Wisconsin’s lead and legislate that when the statute of limitations 
runs on a debt claim, the underlying debt is terminated.182 If the debt itself 
expired, a former debtholder could not file a proof of claim in a bankruptcy 
case without directly lying about that debt’s existence.  Thus, debt collec-
tors would have no incentive to file proofs of claim for time-barred debt if 
they faced FDCPA liability every time they did so.
CONCLUSION
When debt purchasers flood courts with proofs of claim for stale 
debts, they purposely manipulate predictable failures of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  These claims are unenforceable in legal proceedings and are un-
questionably subject to iron-clad affirmative defenses.  Despite this, debt 
purchasers have developed a scheme to trick debtors and bankruptcy courts 
into enforcing these claims.  This scheme is deceptive, misleading, and 
unconscionable.  Filing knowingly unenforceable claims (and hoping that 
no one catches them) burdens the debtor, the estate, other creditors, the 
trustee, and the bankruptcy court.  As a result, debt purchasers who flood 
bankruptcy courts with proofs of claim for time-barred debts must be held 
accountable.  Where the Bankruptcy Code’s protections fail, the FDCPA 
should provide a remedy.
182. See Bowden, supra note 37.
